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Abstract
AI has long pursued the goal of having systems rea-
son over explicitly provided knowledge, but build-
ing suitable representations has proved challenging.
Here we explore whether transformers can simi-
larly learn to reason (or emulate reasoning), but us-
ing rules expressed in language, thus bypassing a
formal representation. We provide the first demon-
stration that this is possible, and characterize the
extent of this capability. To do this, we use a col-
lection of synthetic datasets that test increasing lev-
els of reasoning complexity (number of rules, pres-
ence of negation, and depth of chaining). We find
transformers appear to learn rule-based reasoning
with high (99%) accuracy on these datasets, and in
a way that generalizes to test data requiring sub-
stantially deeper chaining than in the training data
(95%+ scores). We also demonstrate that the mod-
els transfer well to two hand-authored rulebases,
and to rulebases paraphrased into more natural lan-
guage. These findings are significant as it suggests
a new role for transformers, namely as a limited
“soft theorem prover” operating over explicit theo-
ries in language. This in turn suggests new possi-
bilities for explainability, correctability, and coun-
terfactual reasoning in question-answering. All
datasets and a live demo are available at http://rule-
reasoning.apps.allenai.org/.
1 Introduction
AI has long pursued the goal of giving a system explicit
knowledge, and having it reason over that knowledge to reach
conclusions, dating back to the earliest years of the field,
e.g., McCarthy’s Advice Taker (1959), and Newell and Si-
mon’s Logic Theorist (1956). While this has resulted in im-
pressive applications, e.g., [Metaxiotis et al., 2002], build-
ing and reasoning over the required formal representations
has also proved challenging [Musen and Van der Lei, 1988].
In this work, we explore a modern approach to this goal,
and ask whether transformers can be trained to directly rea-
son (or emulate reasoning), but using rules expressed in lan-
guage, thus bypassing a formal representation. If this can be
Alan is blue. Alan is rough. Alan is young.
Bob is big. Bob is round.
Charlie is big. Charlie is blue. Charlie is green.
Dave is green. Dave is rough.
If someone is young and round then they are kind.
Big people are rough.
If someone is round and big then they are blue.
All rough people are green.
Q1: Bob is green. True/false? [Answer: T]
Q2: Bob is kind. True/false? [F]
Q3: Dave is blue. True/false? [F]
Figure 1: Questions in our datasets involve reasoning with rules.
The inputs to the model are the context (facts + rules) and a question.
The output is the T/F answer to the question. Here the underlying
reasoning for the true fact (Q1) is: Bob is big, therefore rough (rule2)
therefore green (rule4). (This is an example of depth 2 reasoning).
Note that the rules themselves change for different questions in the
datasets. Facts not provably true are assumed false (closed-world
assumption).
done, new opportunities for question-answering, explainabil-
ity, correctability, and counterfactual reasoning may become
possible.
This goal is quite distinct from question-answering as
selecting an answer span in a passage, today’s prevailing
paradigm, e.g., [Rajpurkar et al., 2016]. Rather, we want the
system to reason over the provided rules to find conclusions
that follow. Our goal is also distinct from that of inducing
rules from examples, e.g., given instances of family relation-
ships, inducing that a parent’s parent is a grandparent [Sinha
et al., 2019], something that transformers are already known
to do well. Rather, here we provide rules explicitly, and wish
transformers to draw appropriate conclusions, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Here, rather than inducing rules from examples,
our task involves learning to emulate a reasoning algorithm.
We provide the first demonstration that this is possible,
i.e., that transformers can reason with explicit rule sets in
language. This result suggests a new role for transformers,
namely as a kind of limited “soft theorem prover” (Figure 2).1
1 Strictly speaking, the model is not a theorem prover as it only
outputs the proof results, not the proof itself. In Section 4.5, we
describe first steps to also recovering the chain of reasoning.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
05
86
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
L]
  1
4 F
eb
 20
20
This in turn may allow inspection and control of the knowl-
edge that the model is manipulating, with potential benefits
for explanation, correctability, and counterfactual reasoning.
Our investigations here are in a limited setting: Rules are
linguistic expressions of conjunctive implications condition
[∧ condition]* → conclusion,2 with the semantics of logic
programs with negation [Apt et al., 1988]; and reasoning is
the deduction of a statement’s truth according to these seman-
tics.3 However, although there is still a potentially large gap
to natural language inference (NLI),4 our approach also sug-
gests a path to teaching machines to reason over broader lan-
guage, with similar potential benefits.
We leave open the question of whether the transformer is
actually “reasoning”, and even what that might mean in a
neural setting. Rather, we show that transformers can reli-
ably emulate the i/o behavior of a formal reasoner, including
applied to test data requiring more reasoning that at training
time, two hand-authored rulebases, and rulebases rephrased
into more natural (crowdsourced) language.
The paper is organized to address the following questions,
and contributes the following results:
1. Can transformers learn to reason with explicit rules?
We train and test on rules expressed in (synthetic) lan-
guage, and find high (99%) accuracy, including on test
questions requiring a greater depth of reasoning than
seen during training (scoring up to 95%, Table 1).
2. Can the trained model solve hand-authored reason-
ing problems? We find the trained models are able to
solve five of six variants of two independently authored
rule-based problems, zero shot (90%+ scores, Table 4).
3. Do the results transfer to theories expressed in more
natural language? Models also perform well when
trained and tested on theories paraphrased into more nat-
ural (crowdsourced) language (98% score). The best
earlier model can even partially solve these problems
zero-shot (66% accuracy, Table 5).
4. Can the model identify which facts an answer de-
pends on? We show that the model is largely able to
do this (94% F1), including perfectly for over 70% of
the questions. This is a first step towards having a model
create an explanation for its conclusions. (Section 4.5
and Figure 9).
5. Can other neural architectures learn to reason? Our
experiments show a particular transformer (RoBERTa)
is sufficient for our tasks, but is it necessary? We show
that two other systems, BERT and ESIM (an LSTM-
based model) [Chen et al., 2016], are also able to learn
these tasks, albeit with lower scores (95% and 80% re-
spectively, vs. 98%). This suggests that our results
are not specific to RoBERTa or transformers, although
transformers learn the tasks more easily (Table 6).
2 where conditions and conclusions are (possibly negated) liter-
als using binary predicates.
3We only consider rulebases where all statements have a well-
defined truth value, i.e., consistent, stratified rulebases.
4 NLI is informally defined as making inferences from language
that “a person would typically infer” [Dagan et al., 2013], and in-
cludes use of many linguistic forms, unstated background knowl-
edge, and sometimes unsound inference steps.
Figure 2: (a) Traditional formal reasoning applies a theorem prover
to axioms in order to answer a question. (b) Our work here strives
for a linguistic analog, where a transformer serves as a “soft theorem
prover” over knowledge expressed linguistically.
Although our demonstrations are within constrained envi-
ronments, the work suggests new avenues for using trans-
formers for both formal theorem proving and natural lan-
guage inference (NLI), discussed in Section 5. In partic-
ular, the ability to derive reasoned conclusions from stated
knowledge suggests new opportunities for explainability, cor-
rectability/machine instruction, and counterfactual reasoning
in question-answering.
2 Related Work
While our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first sys-
tematic study of transformers reasoning over explicitly stated
rule sets, there are several datasets that make a first step to-
wards this by testing whether neural systems can apply ex-
plicit, general knowledge in a particular situation. Two syn-
thetic datasets that test whether a single rule can be applied
correctly are as follows:
1. Task 15 in the bAbI dataset [Weston et al., 2015] applies
rules of the form “Xs are afraid of Ys” to an instance,
e.g., “Sheep are afraid of wolves. Gertrude is a sheep.
What is Gertrude afraid of? A:wolves”
2. The synthetic, conditional probes in [Richardson et al.,
2020] test single rule application, e.g., “If Joe has visited
Potsdam then Anne has visited Pampa. Joe has visited
Potsdam. Has Anne visted Pampa? A:yes”
The associated papers also show that neural systems can learn
these tasks almost perfectly (100% and >97% accuracy re-
spectively).
Similarly, two reading comprehension datasets involve ap-
plying general rule(s) to text:
3. In the QuaRTz dataset [Tafjord et al., 2019], the “rules”
are qualitative relationships, e.g., “A sunscreen with a
higher SPF protects the skin longer.”, and the dataset
tests whether a system can apply a rule correctly to a
situation, e.g., “Billy is wearing sunscreen with a lower
SPF than Lucy. Who will be best protected from the
sun?”, thus testing one-step rule application.
4. ROPES (Reasoning over Paragraph Effects in Situa-
tions) [Lin et al., 2019] is similar, except the general
knowledge is contained within a paragraph-length pas-
sage and must be applied to a pararagraph-length situa-
tion.
While the non-synthetic nature of QuaRTz and ROPES adds
realism to the task, it also complicates them as a test of “ma-
chine reasoning”, in the sense of (producing the i/o behavior
of) chaining rules to reach a conclusion. Rather, they test
reading comprehension, requiring not just “reasoning” but
also use of background knowledge and handling the diversity
of language.
Although our core datasets may seem similar to the bAbI
dataset [Weston et al., 2015] in using synthetic data, our
probes are qualitatively different. Specifically, apart from
bAbI Task 15 (above), the underlying rules needed to infer
an answer in the bAbI tasks are implicit. For example, an-
swering Task 1 questions such as “Mary went to the hallway.
John went to the office. Where is Mary? A: hallway” re-
quires inducing state-change rules such as “X moves to Y→
X at Y”. In other words, the bAbI tasks test whether a system
can learn and apply these underlying rules from examples,
while our concern here is reasoning with explicit rule sets,
potentially different for each example (Figure 1).
Similarly, our work is qualitatively distinct from work on
multihop reasoning datasets, e.g., HotpotQA [Yang et al.,
2018]. Again, for those problems, the implicit rules of in-
ference (i.e., which multihop chains are valid) need to be in-
ferred from examples (e.g., that “causes” is transitive). In our
case, rules of inference are explicitly stated.
Our work can be seen as evaluating transformers for (a
subset of) Natural Logic [MacCartney and Manning, 2014;
Moss, 2010], i.e., formal inference over statements expressed
in language. It is also related to textual entailment and Nat-
ural Language Inference (NLI) [Manning and MacCartney,
2009], but with the important difference that NLI also allows
unsupported inferences that “a person would typically infer”
[Dagan et al., 2013]. We discuss bridging the gap between
our work and NLI in Section 5.4.
Several researchers have developed methods for Neural
Theorem Proving (NTP), combining symbolic and neural
methods to reason step-wise over language-derived struc-
tures, e.g., [Weber et al., 2019; Minervini et al., 2019;
Minervini et al., 2018]. Similarly, there has been work on
SAT solving [Selsam et al., 2018], approximate (DNF) model
counting [Abboud et al., 2020], and formula embedding [Ab-
delaziz et al., 2020; Crouse et al., 2019] with neural networks,
to help solve formal reasoning problems. While our goals are
similar, we do not impose any structure on the neural reason-
ing process, instead wanting to know if the (i/o of the) rea-
soning process itself is learnable, using knowledge expressed
in language.
Our task can perhaps best be viewed as one of algorithm
emulation, here for systematic reasoning with rules. There
have been numerous other demonstrations that transformers
either already know [Talmor et al., 2019] or can learn to emu-
late other algorithms, including for semantic parsing [He and
Choi, 2019], machine translation [Wang et al., 2019], sym-
bolic integration [Lample and Charton, 2019], and mathemat-
ics [Saxton et al., 2019]. Here we investigate a transformer’s
ability to learn rule-based reasoning.
3 Dataset Generation
To investigate a transformer’s ability to emulate rule-
based reasoning, we generate five datasets requiring var-
ious depths of inference to answer the questions, as we
now describe. Each example in a dataset is a triple
(context,statement,answer), where context has the form
(fact*,rule*), statement is the question, namely a declarative
sentence to prove, and answer is either T (true) if statement
deductively follows from the context, or F if it does not (false
under a closed-world assumption, CWA). Facts, rules, and
the question statements are expressed in (synthetic) English.
Each example is essentially a (linguistic) standalone logical
theory with an “Is it true?” question (the statement) posed
against it. By virtue of the dataset generation procedure (be-
low), we know every question can be answered by a formal
reasoner (under a CWA). We are interested in whether a trans-
former can similarly learn to answer these questions, appar-
ently requiring some neural form of reasoning.
3.1 Overview
To generate each example, we first generate a small theory
(facts + rules) in logic, perform forward inference to de-
rive all its implications, then select question statements from
those implications (answer=true), and from unproven (posi-
tive) facts (answer=false, under the CWA).
The facts, rules, and questions are then expressed in (syn-
thetic) English using simple natural language templates. We
generate five datasets, each constrained by the maximum
depth of inference required to prove the facts used in its ques-
tions (up to depths D=0, D≤1, D≤2, D≤3 and D≤5 respec-
tively). Depth D=0 means the true facts can be “proved” by
simple lookup in the context (no inference). The fifth dataset,
called DMax, contains questions up to depth 5, and is used to
test generalization to depths unseen in training on the other
four datasets.
3.2 Theory Generation
Theories contain two types of facts:
• atributes is(ei, aj) e.g., is(Alan,Big).
• relations rk(ei, ek) e.g., eats(Dog,Rabbit).
The is() predicate assigns attributes to entities, while the rk()
predicates relate two entities. Like people names, the symbols
Dog, Rabbit, etc. also denote specific entities, i.e., denote
“the dog”, “the rabbit”, etc. Rules are of the form:
condition [∧ condition]*→ conclusion.
The first condition is a predicate whose first argument is a
variable,5 and second argument is an attribute or entity. For
each subsequent condition and the conclusion, they are also
5 Or with 20% probability, an entity, in order to include some
fully grounded rules in the datasets.
The bald eagle does not eat the dog. The cat chases the dog.
The cat eats the bald eagle. The cat is nice. The cat likes the dog.
The cat likes the rabbit. The dog is furry.
The rabbit chases the bald eagle. The rabbit eats the bald eagle.
If someone does not eat the cat then they do not eat the dog.
If someone likes the bald eagle then they do not like the rabbit.
If someone eats the bald eagle and they do not eat the rabbit
then they are furry.
If someone is furry then they like the cat.
Q1. The bald eagle likes the cat. True/false? [F]
Q2. The rabbit likes the cat. True/false? [T]
Q3. The bald eagle is furry. True/false? [F]
Figure 3: An example of a rulebase and 3 questions using relations
with negation. The reasoning for the [T] answer is: The rabbit eats
the bald eagle (given), therefore the rabbit is furry (rule3), therefore
the rabbit likes the cat (rule4).
predicates whose first argument is either the same variable or
a previously mentioned entity, and the second argument is a
new attribute or entity. (In this way, rules are constrained to
have at most one variable. Rules are implicitly universally
quantified over that variable). For example, the formal form
of the first rule in Figure 1 looks:
// If someone is young and round then they are kind.
is(?X,Young) ∧ is(?X,Round)→ is(?X,Kind).
Each theory contains 1-16 facts and 1-9 rules generated at
random. We generate two types of theory:
1. Type 1 uses only the is() predicate, with 4 entities
{Alan,Bob,...} and 7 (non-mutually-exclusive) attributes
{Blue,Rough,Young,...}, drawn randomly from pools of
10 names and 14 attributes respectively.
2. Type 2 uses is() and 3 other predicates {likes(),
chases(), ...}, 4 entities {Cat,Dog,BaldEagle,...}, and 5
attributes {Big,Furry,...}, drawn randomly from pools of
size 6, 10, and 10 respectively.
We also generate a version of each that adds negation (not)
in the facts and rule conditions/conclusions. Figure 1 is an
example of Type 1, without negation. Figure 3 is an ex-
ample of Type 2, with negation. Each dataset contains 100k
examples (25k of each Type × without/with negation). Data
is randomly split 70/10/20 into train/dev/test partitions, en-
suring no overlap of theories between each partition.
3.3 Forward Inference
Given a randomly generated theory (facts+rules), we perform
exhaustive forward inference to find all its implications, not-
ing their proof(s). (As the domains are finite, the number of
implications are finite too). For semantics, we treat the rule-
base as a logic program, and infer the minimal, supported
answer set implied by the program [Apt et al., 1988]. Nega-
tions in the rules’ conditions are treated as negation as failure
(NAF), and we ensure that the rulebase is stratified to avoid
ambiguity and cycles [Bidoit and Froidevaux, 1991]. Infer-
ence is performed layerwise to find the minimal supported
model, and inconsistent and unstratified rulebases are dis-
carded. We also check that inference proceeds to the depth
required for the target dataset, e.g., for the D≤3 dataset, at
last one fact must require depth 3 inference to infer it for all
its theories.
3.4 Question Generation and English Synthesis
For each theory, we generate several questions with answer
‘true’ by selecting from the inferred facts, one at each depth
of inference from 0 to the dataset’s target depth (e.g., for the
D≤2 dataset, we generate 3 ‘true’ questions at depths d = 0, 1,
and 2 for each theory). For each ‘true’ question we also gen-
erate a ‘false’ question by negating a conclusion proven at the
same depth. We then generate the same number of questions
using facts that are unproven (false under a closed-world as-
sumption), drawing equally from unproven, instantiated pos-
itive rule conclusions or other unproven positive facts. Half
are used as questions labeled as false (via the CWA), and for
diversity, half are flipped by negating the fact and changing
the label to true (i.e., “f? False” becomes “Not f? True”).
Thus a theory for depth d has (up to) 4(d+1) questions, with
an equal balance of true and false answers. Each question is
also annotated with the inference depth needed to answer it.6
Finally the theories and questions are converted into (syn-
thetic) English, using simple natural language templates plus
rules to improve fluency (e.g., using pronouns). We use three
templates (randomly selected per rule): “If condition [and
condition]* then conclusion.”, “All attribute* people|things
are attribute.”, and “attribute* people|things are attribute.”,
the last two only applicable to rules involving just attributes.
Examples are shown in Figures 1 and 3.
4 Experiments
We now describe five sets of experiments we have conducted,
addressing the five questions described in the Introduction.
4.1 Models
We conduct all our experiments (bar Section 4.6) using
RoBERTa-large, additionally fine-tuned on the RACE dataset
[Lai et al., 2017]. This additional fine-tuning step has been
previously shown to help with sensitivity to hyperparameters
[Phang et al., 2018] and improve question-answering [Sun et
al., 2018]. We use fixed hyperparameters (learning rate etc),
inheriting the settings from RoBERTa on RACE [Liu et al.,
2019].
We train RoBERTa to predict true/false (i.e., binary clas-
sification) for each question statement. Questions are sup-
plied to RoBERTa as: [CLS] context [SEP] statement [SEP],
where context is the theory (facts+rules, expressed in lan-
guage) and statement is the fact to try and prove. The [CLS]
output token is projected to a single logit. A logit score of
>0 is treated as predicting true, otherwise the answer is false.
Training is performed using cross-entropy loss. For evalua-
tion, we measure accuracy. (The test data has an equally bal-
ance of TRUE/FALSE answers, hence the baseline of random
guessing is 50%).
6For proven facts, we use the depth of the shallowest proof tree.
For unproven facts, we use the depth of the shallowest branch of
the proof tree that fails (or the deepest of the shallowest if there are
multiple (failed) proofs).
Table 1: Accuracy of models (Mod0,...) trained and tested on the five
datasets (“Test (own)” row), and tested on all, and different slices, of
the DMax test set. The boxed area indicates test problems at depths
unseen during training.
4.2 Can RoBERTa Answer Reasoning Questions?
We train and test RoBERTa models on each of our datasets
D=0, D≤1, D≤2, D≤3, and DMax, containing problems re-
quiring reasoning up to depths 0, 1, 2, 3, and 5 respectively.
We then test the models on the DMax dataset, that includes
problems at depths greater than the other datasets. The re-
sults are shown in Table 1. The results suggest the following
findings:
1. RoBERTa is able to master the test data almost per-
fectly (99% accuracy, row 1) even though the specific
reasoning problems (facts+rules) in each test question
are distinct from those in the training set.
2. The Depth=0 model, Mod0, only trained on lookup
questions, is (unsurprisingly) unable to answer ques-
tions requiring reasoning (column Mod0).7
3. As we train with increasingly deep inference, the mod-
els’ ability to generalize improves. The D≤2 model
(questions involving problems up to depth 2) achieves
71.1% on Depth=3 problems, while the D≤3 model
generalizes well right up to the maximum depth tested
(e..g, 97.6% for Depth=5 problems).
Looking at the models’ accuracies (on their own in-
distribution test data) as a function of training size, we see
the higher depth models require more data to learn (Figure 4),
but have better out-of-domain performance (boxed area in Ta-
ble 1).
We additionally test the robustness of the models’ answers
by perturbing the original theories. Specifically, for each test
fact f that is true, we test whether removing a sentence that
is part of the proof of f causes the prediction to (desirably)
flip from true to false. We call these sentences in the proof
tree critical sentences, as the truth of f depends on them.
7 In fact, we see an interesting learning artifact, namely Mod0
scores worse than random (50%) at depths higher than 2. This arises
as Mod0 learns to predict all (positive) facts are false except the ex-
plicitly given facts, as that is all it has seen at training time. However,
most (90%) of the facts proven at depth 2+ in DMax are positive
facts proven true, hence Mod0 gets these all wrong. In a few cases,
a fact is proven false at depth 2+, and thus Mod0 will by chance get
these right. However, it is rare (10%) to see a negated fact with a
proof, as half the theories do not use negation, and for the remain-
der, negative rule conclusions are generated with lower probability
than positive rule conclusions during dataset generation. We see a
similar artifact with the Mod1 model.
Mod0
Mod1
Mod2
Mod3
MMax
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000
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0.7
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Figure 4: Learning rates (in-distribution test accuracy vs. number
of training examples). The lower depth models require less training
data, but do not generalize well (boxed area in Table 1).
Conversely, removing an irrelevant sentence should cause no
change to the model’s prediction. As we know the original
proof trees for each fact f in the dataset, we can identify the
critical and irrelevant sentences by simple inspection of those
trees.8 Typically, 1-6 sentences of the ≈15-20 sentences are
critical for proving each provable fact.
We test this using the no-negation9 half of the DMax test
set (≈10k questions). In this partition, 5904 questions have
proofs (are true). (The remaining questions are false under
the CWA).10 For each of these questions, we remove each of
the theory sentences si in turn, and measure the prediction ac-
curacy on each result. As there are about 19 sentences/theory
on average, this results in 113978 “sentence removed” probes
(of which 20746 have a critical sentence removed, and 93232
have an irrelevant sentence removed). Ideally, removing a
sentence critical to a question f should flip the model’s pre-
diction from T to F, while removing a noncritical sentence
should leave the prediction unchanged as T. We also measure
overall performance on the entire dataset of questions with
perturbed theories.
The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. We observe:
1. The overall accuracy is largely unchanged on the full
collection of questions with perturbed theories, suggest-
ing robustness to these variants (last column, Table 2).
2. For the (20k) questions where the prediction is expected
to flip from true to false, we see this flip occurs 81% of
the time, Table 3. This suggestsmoderate robustness to
this specific type of perturbation, although notably less
than for a formal theorem prover (that would make this
flip 100% of the time). For the remaining (93k) ques-
tions, the prediction (correctly) stays true over 99% of
the time (no Table).
8 If there are multiple, alternative proofs for f , we define a crit-
ical sentence as one that is used in all the proofs. To support tihs,
we generate and record all possible proofs for each provable fact f
during dataset generation.
9 With negation, the definition of critical sentence becomes more
complex because the the theory is non-monotonic (i.e., removing a
sentence may cause a fact to become true). Hence, we omit theories
with negation for this analysis.
10 For questions that were flipped from “f? False” to “Not f?
True” to encourage diversity, we undo the flips and just consider the
positive forms of facts f .
Original Remove Remove Remove
Irrelevant Critical Any
Accuracy (test) 99.4 99.6 81.2 96.3
Table 2: Accuracy on the DMax (no negation) subset, and all its
(113k) perturbed (one context sentence removed) variants. The over-
all accuracy (Remove Any, last column) is largely unchanged, but
with a drop for the subset where a critical sentence was removed.
Original predictions for true (positive) facts:
T F
New T 3895 (should have flipped) 10 (incorrectly flips)
Pred. F 16654 (correct flips) 187 (becomes correct)
Table 3: On the true questions that were originally answered cor-
rectly (column 1), the predicted T answer should flip to predicted
F when a critical sentence is removed. In practice, we observe this
happens 81% of the time (16654/(16654+3895)). In a few (197)
cases, the predicted answer was incorrect to start with (column 2).
When an irrelevant sentence is removed, the predicted answer stays
correct (T) over 99% of the time (not shown).
4.3 Performance on Hand-Authored Problems
To further test robustness and out-of-distribution perfor-
mance, we test the trained models on two hand-authored
reasoning problems, both including reasoning with negation,
written independently of our datasets. Note that these new
datasets are used purely as test sets (no training on them,
i.e., zero-shot performance); their vocabulary of entities, at-
tributes, and predicates (bar is()) are all new to the models at
test time.
Test Datasets
Birds The “birds” rulebase is a well-known logic problem
illustrating the use of “abnormality” predicates [McCarthy,
1984]. We entered Sergot’s formulation of it11 verbatim (bar
syntax), and generated a series of test questions using the
same procedure as earlier. Figure 5 illustrates the problem (in
restricted English, exactly as presented to our model) and four
example questions. We created two linguistic expressions of
the formal theory, Birds1 and Birds2. Birds2 is shown in Fig-
ure 5, while Birds1 is identical except “can/cannot fly” is re-
placed with “is/is not flying” to make the negation (“not”)
more explicit (this turns out not to matter).
Electricity We also created a small rulebase about an elec-
trical circuit, describing the conditions for an appliance to
function. We created 4 variants of increasing complexity,
containing 5, 6, 11, and 12 rules respectively. For each rule-
base, we generate different scenarios (the facts) by randomly
selecting from possible ground facts. Questions are then gen-
erated against each scenario using the same procedure as ear-
lier, resulting in 4 test sets. Figure 6 shows the Electricity2
rulebase with an example scenario plus three questions. (Ap-
pendix B shows all four rulebases).
Results
The results are in Table 4, tested using the earlier trained mod-
els. Note that these new problems and vocabularies were un-
11https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/∼mjs/teaching/KnowledgeRep491/
ExtendedLP 491-2x1.pdf, p5, also in Appendix A.
If someone is a bird and not abnormal then they can fly.
If someone is an ostrich then they are a bird.
If someone is an ostrich then they are abnormal.
If someone is an ostrich then they cannot fly.
If someone is a bird and wounded then they are abnormal.
If someone is wounded then they cannot fly.
Arthur is a bird. Arthur is not wounded. Bill is an ostrich.
Colin is a bird. Colin is wounded.
Dave is not an ostrich. Dave is wounded.
Q1.Arthur can fly. True/false? [T] Q2.Bill can fly. True/false? [F]
Q3.Colin can fly. True/false? [F] Q4.Dave can fly. True/false? [F]
Figure 5: Sergot’s “birds” puzzle includes reasoning about abnor-
mality predicates. The dataset contains these and other questions
about the single theory.
The circuit has a switch.
The switch is on.
The circuit has a light bulb.
If a circuit has a switch and the switch is on
then the circuit is complete.
If a circuit does not have a switch then the circuit is complete.
If a circuit is complete then a current runs through the circuit.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a light bulb
then the light bulb is glowing.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a bell
then the bell is ringing.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a radio
then the radio is playing.
Q1. The circuit is not complete. True/false? [F]
Q2. The light bulb is glowing. True/false? [T]
Q3. The radio is playing. True/false? [F]
Figure 6: The simple Electricity2 rulebase, an example circuit, and 3
questions about the circuit. (Circuit diagram is for illustration only).
seen during training (i.e., are zero-shot). We observe:
1. The “birds” problems are solved (almost) perfectly by
all but the non-reasoning (Mod0) model (MMax gets one
question wrong on Birds1).
2. The MMax model (trained on DMax) solves all but one
of these datasets with 90%+ scores.
These are two point demonstrations that the trained models
can be used to solve novel reasoning problems with high reli-
ability (90%+ in all but one case).
We see one surprising anomaly also: the models trained
with deeper reasoning depths do slightly worse on Electric-
ity4 than the depth 1 model, Mod1. From investigation, we
find almost all failing questions at higher depths are those
where the queried fact f is an unsatisfied rule conclusion
(hence should be false), in particular when the first argument
of f is not the first argument of one of the rule’s conditions.
Because of the way the original dataset was generated, exam-
ples similar to this are very rare in the training data, possibly
causing this anomaly. More generally this illustrates that even
when trained on a diversity of problems, the trained model
can have unanticipated blind-spots. We discuss this further in
Table 4: Accuracy of the earlier models tested on hand-crafted rule-
bases (zero shot, no fine-tuning). Note that the models were only
trained on the earlier datasets (e.g., Figures 1 and 3), and thus the
new rulebases’ entities, attributes, and predicates (bar is()) are com-
pletely unseen until test time.
Section 5.2.
4.4 Reasoning with Paraphrased Rules
Our experiments so far have been with synthetic language,
but our ultimate goal is to reason over full natural language.
To test transfer to more natural linguistic forms, we generated
a new dataset of 40k examples, using crowdworkers to para-
phrase our theories. Of course, this only tests robustness to
paraphrasing, not to abitrary natural language. Nevertheless,
it is a small first step in this direction.
To generate our data, we follow a similar approach to
[Sinha et al., 2019], described below. For this experiment,
we used Type 1 theories without negation, i.e., the same form
as in Figure 1.
Dataset Generation
To generate the new dataset, called ParaRules, we first gener-
ated a novel collection of 10k theories (facts+rules) expressed
in synthetic language, as before, then extracted the “fact
groups” and rules from each. A “fact group” is all the facts in
a theory about a particular person, e.g., (from Figure 1) “Alan
is blue. Alan is rough. Alan is young.”, while a rule is just the
original “If...then...” sentence. We then asked crowdworkers
to creatively re-express the fact-groups and rules, shown to
them in English, in their own words. For example, the earlier
fact-group might be rewritten as: “Alan is on the young side,
but rough. He often feels rather blue.”. Rewritten fact-groups
were then turned into templates by variabilizing the person
name. Turkers also rephrased each rule (no variabilization
needed). Rephrasings were automatically checked to make
sure that all the key attributes were mentioned (and no others
included), and rejected otherwise.
We use these to assemble the new ParaRules dataset of 40k
questions against ≈2k theories expressed in the paraphrased
language. To build each theory, facts were collected by ran-
domly sampling and instantiating fact-group templates with
people’s names, and rules were randomly sampled. An ex-
ample is shown in Figure 7. The train, dev, and test sets were
generated using different partitions of the templates, to ensure
that no templates were shared between partitions.
As we kept track of the corresponding logic underlying
each fact group and rule, we can then generate questions as
before: Exhaustively forward-chain on the (logic version of)
the theory, discard if a contradiction is hit or reasoning is of
insufficient depth (we require at least depth 3 reasoning), and
Alan, who is round, red, kind, and also green, tends to be rather blue.
In the snow sits Bob, crying from being cold. Charlie has green teeth
and rough skin. People also notice his blue eyes.
A quite nice person who is red and green is also big.
Any big, kind person that turns red is cold to the touch.
Young, kind people have a habit of being nice.
A kind person will certainly be young.
Q1. Dave is nice. True/false? [F]
Q2. Charlie is big. True/false? [F]
Q3. Alan is nice. True/false? [T]
Figure 7: A paraphrased theory in the ParaRules dataset. The rea-
soning for the true answer here is: Alan is kind (given), therefore
young (rule4), therefore nice (rule3).
Table 5: Accuracy with rules paraphrased into more natural lan-
guage (ParaRules), without fine-tuning (zero shot) and with (last
column only). The strongest zero-shot model (MMax) partially
solves (66.6%) this problem zero-shot, with strongest performance
for depth 0 and 1 inferences.
then for each depth select inferred and non-inferred facts as
true/false questions as before.
Results
We ran the earlier trained models on the ParaRules test par-
tition (no fine-tuning, i.e., zero shot). The results are shown
in Table 5. The strongest model, MMax, partially solves this
dataset with a score of 66.6%, higher for questions requiring
less inference, and lower for questions requiring more infer-
ence. (The below-random scores for D=0 reflect the same ar-
tifact as earlier, namely predicting everything as false except
for facts explicitly given. See Footnote 7).
Note that these results are for zero-shot, with no model ex-
posure to the paraphrased data during training. In constrast,
we also trained a model using both of the D≤3 and ParaRules
training partitions. The resulting model (last column in Ta-
ble 5) has an accuracy of 98.8% on the ParaRules test par-
tition (even though the ParaRules test rewordings are dis-
tinct from train and dev), showing near-perfect performance
is learnable. Although a limited study, this suggests that our
findings may extend to rulebases expressed in more natural
language.
4.5 Generating Explanations
In Section 4.2, we tested (for the no-negation theories)
whether removing a theory sentence si caused the prediction
for a true fact f to flip to false, and found that sentences caus-
ing a flip were very often (98%) part of the original proof of
f (i.e., critical sentences), while sentences that did not were
not (97%). Using that data about which removed sentences
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Above, the model has correctly identified the sentences critical to the answer (shown in green). Here, the underlying line of reasoning is:
“The lion is red (first highlighted statement), therefore young (third highlighted), and as it also cold (second) it visits the rabbit (fourth).”
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Above, the model has identified two critical sentences (green), but has missed three (purple) and included an irrelevant rule (red). Here, the
underlying line of reasoning is: “The lion eats the squirrel (fourth highlighted statement), therefore is rough (third), therefore young (first),
and as it also sees the squirrel (sixth) it is green (second).”
————————-
Figure 8: Examples of the model identifying sentences critical to the answer, perfectly (upper figure) and imperfectly (lower figure). Perfect
identification occurs for over 70% of the provable answers (See Figure 9 for a full histogram).
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Figure 9: Counts of the F1 scores for predicting which sentences are
critical to the proofs of questions in DMax (test, no negation subset).
For over 70% of the questions, the model predicts critical sentences
perfectly (F1=1.0), with high F1 in the remaining case.
caused a flip, we can build a map of the theory paragraph
showing which sentences the model considers critical to a
conclusion, a potentially first step to providing an explana-
tion for the model’s answers. Figure 8 shows two examples,
the first showing where the model has perfectly identified the
critical sentences, and the second where it has made some
errors.
We can quantify this “explanatory” performance by mea-
suring the per-proof scores of predicted vs. actual critical
sentences for each question, measuring the precision, recall,
and F1 scores for each question in turn. The (macro)average
P/R/F1 scores are P=98.7, R=86.9, and F1=92.4, suggesting
a high degree of reliability in predicting sentences critical to
a proof. (This is essentially an alternative view on the earlier
robustness data, viewed from a per-proof perspective). A his-
togram of the F1 scores is shown in Figure 9, indicating per-
fect critical sentence identification for over 70% of the ques-
tions, and high F1 for the remaining questions. This suggests
the model has some knowledge of the dependencies between
the context sentences and a particular conclusion.
Table 6: Transformers (RoBERTa,BERT) are sufficient but not
strictly necessary for this task, although other architectures (ESIM)
do not score as well. DECOMP was run as a sanity check that the
datasets are not trivially solvable - its low score (random baseline is
50%) suggests they are not.
4.6 Other Architectures
To what extent are our results specific to RoBERTa? To ex-
plore this, we also trained BERT and ESIM (an LSTM-based
model for natural language inference) [Chen et al., 2016] on
our datasets. Also, as a sanity check that our datasets are
not trivially solvable, we ran the decompable attention model
(DECOMP) on our data [Parikh et al., 2016]. The results are
shown in Table 6.
We observe that the strongest BERT model trained up to
depth 3 (Mod3) masters the dataset that includes higher in-
ference depths (DMax) with 95%+ accuracy, while ESIM’s
scores are lower (≈80%). Note that unlike RoBERTa and
BERT, ESIM was not pre-trained on large amounts of text,
perhaps contributing to its lower scores. This suggests that
our results are not specific to RoBERTa or transformers, al-
though transformers seem to learn the tasks more easily. As
expected, DECOMP does not do well (a random baseline
score is 50%), suggesting the datasets are not trivially solv-
able.
A related question is: how important is pretraining? To test
this, we generated a version of the D≤3 dataset in which ev-
ery word was (systematically) replaced by a random word, so
that there was no grammaticality in the theories. After train-
ing (using the best hyperparameter settings we could find, us-
ing the dev partition), RoBERTa scores 83.3% on the test par-
tition, substantially below the 99.3% on the original dataset in
restricted English (Table 1). This suggests that the pretrained
knowledge in RoBERTa is playing a role in its performance
and making learning easier. Similarly the zero-shot transfer
to hand-authored language, Figure 7 and Table 5, suggests
pretrained knowledge of language may be playing a role.
5 Discussion
We now discuss the bounds of the work we have conducted,
broader research questions that it opens up, and opportunities
for future work.
5.1 Scope of our Theories
While we have demonstrated that transformers can emulate a
form of deductive reasoning, our demonstrations have been
with small theory sizes (< 20 facts, < 10 rules), small do-
mains (< 100 possible ground facts), and with a limited rule
language (at most one variable that is universally quanti-
fied over) in propositional logic.12 In addition, our training
datasets have been generated under particular assumptions
and distributions (e.g., that all entities to be queried will be
mentioned at least once in the theory facts) that may not hold
in general. While we have shown several data points sug-
gesting that the trained model generalizes outside the training
regimen, the full scope of its generalization is still unknown.
More generally, demonstrating reasoning with more com-
plex theories and richer rule languages is still an open task.
For example, we limited rules to have at most one vari-
able (denoted by “someone”/“something”), because express-
ing multi-variable rules can become linguistically cumber-
some (e.g., “If a person’s father is a second person, and the
second person’s father is a third person, then the first person’s
grandfather is the third person.”). Finding and extending the
rule language to more linguistically palatable, multi-variable
implications (e.g., allowing conciser rules such as “Some-
one’s father’s father is their grandfather.”) is a possible next
step.
5.2 Models of Inference
We have shown that our trained model emulates reasoning,
but which particular model of reasoning is it emulating? Our
12 Although our rules include variables, they are universally quan-
tified over finite domains, hence our theories can be reduced to
propositional (variable-free) theories.
training data is generated using a particular semantic theory
of inference, but alternative semantics are possible. For ex-
ample, we make a closed-world assumption (CWA) that any-
thing unproven is false, and (following the semantics of logic
programs [Apt et al., 1988]) we require true facts to be sup-
ported.13 However, these are just design decisions, and other
alternatives are possible. For example, we could have made
an open world assumption that unproven statements have an
unknown truth value, and trained the system using examples
generated with a three-valued logic. Or, we could use an in-
ference model that handles uncertainty, e.g., admiting linguis-
tic modifiers such as “often”, “sometimes”, “a few”, etc. and
train a transformer with examples from that.
What exactly is the nature of the transformer’s reasoning?
Perhaps it is “simply” memorizing different canonical prob-
lem structures, although if so, our results suggest it can still
use this information compositionally to solve novel problems
at unseen depths (Table 1). Nevertheless, Section 4.3 also
suggests that a trained model may have blind-spots, possibly
due to unusual classes of problem unseen in training. If so,
finding ways to characterize the different types of inference
problems (e.g., defining canonical problem “signatures”), and
designing training curricula to ensure they are systematically
covered and/or the model is capable of generalizing to them,
would be valuable.
5.3 Formal Theorem Proving
If a transformer can reliably emulate the results of correct
reasoning, it may have utility for the formal reasoning com-
mmunity. In particular, if its output generalizes to more com-
plex problems than seen during training (as our experiments
demonstrate for one particular setting, Table 1), one might
be able to train on problems that are solvable with reasonable
computing resources, but then apply it to more complex prob-
lems that are computationally infeasible, and still obtain high
accuracy. Even if accuracy is not perfect, the results might
help inform more rigorous theorem-proving. For example,
one could imagine a transformer as a “proof assistant” that
finds likely true conclusions that could then be verified by a
formal reasoner (where verification is easier than proof from
scratch). Our results in Section 4.5 suggest first steps to re-
constructing proofs using the facts and rules in the theory.
Similarly, a system that can identify facts that are likely true
may help guide model generators, e.g., [Niemela¨ and Simons,
1997].
Although we have presented theories in English, another
open question is whether transformers could reason with the-
ories expressed in their native (formal) form, rather than
translated. Similarly, we have not investigated the trans-
former’s behavior with inconsistent theories, again a potential
avenue for further work.
Note that as we increase the complexity/size of the the-
ory, we reach the limit on the number of tokens a transformer
13 A fact is supported if it is either known, or is the conclusion of
a rule whose body is true. Requiring support provides a mechanism
for resolving ambiguities that would otherwise exist. For example,
the theory {¬a → b} has three possible models {¬a, b}, {a,¬b},
and {a, b}, but the latter two are disallowed by the semantics of logic
programs as a is unsupported by the theory.
can handle (≤512). Thus handling larger theories might also
require new transformer architectures, or new methods for
fetching relevant rules to reason with from a larger knowl-
edge base.
5.4 Natural Language Inference (NLI)
Our long-term goal is reasoning over full language, i.e., natu-
ral language inference (NLI). Although we have trained using
restricted English, we want the model to still behave correctly
if the knowledge is expressed in different ways. Our experi-
ments with paraphrased rulebases suggests that indeed there
is transfer from synthetic to more natural language (Table 5),
at least for deductive reasoning.
More generally, though, there are many natural language
statements that do not neatly fit our rule language and its
underlying representation (e.g., “Most birds fly”, “It often
rains in Seattle in winter.”). While our experiments with
paraphrased rulebases suggests the model may still draw the
right conclusions, i.e., there seems to be some transfer, the
results are likely to become less predictable as the seman-
tics get further from those seen at training time. To apply
our methodology to statements with more complex seman-
tics would require new training data, either synthesized from
a richer formal representation and model of inference,14 or
collected from people.
Similarly, the deductive model of inference that we have
taught the system may still be quite far from that required
for NLI. In particular, NLI allows for unsupported inferences
that “a person would typically infer” [Dagan et al., 2013],
while we have used a precise model of inference in which
all of a rule’s conditions need to be proven true in order for
the conclusion to follow. For NLI, we would like our model
to still proceed if there are gaps in the explicitly provided
knowledge, providing the missing knowledge is “obvious”
(and not contradicted by the explicitly provided facts), per-
haps by leveraging its pretrained knowledge. Similarly, our
model’s treatment of negation as failure (NAF) sometimes
clashes with intuitions about NLI, for example given (just)
“If my car does not have gas then it is not working.” our
model will conclude (given nothing else) that “My car is not
working.” as it cannot prove that “My car has gas.”.
This raises a fundamental tension about the nature of
NLI: We want reasoning to be rigorous (conclusions justi-
fied by the information provided), but also “soft” (tolerant of
phrasing differences and commonsense knowledge gaps), and
strictly speaking these two goals are in conflict. Our exper-
iments with Turk-authored language illustrates tolerance of
phrasing differences, which we view as desirable, although in
a strict deductive sense it is unjustified to conclude (say) “A
person is green” from “Charlie has green teeth” (Figure 7).
Similarly we would like the model to tolerate minor, unstated
taxonomic gaps, for example given “Buildings have roofs”
conclude “My house has a roof”, even if “Houses are build-
ings” is not explicitly stated (but not conclude that result if it
is explicitly stated that “Houses are not buildings”).15 Char-
14 If one even exists - formal reasoning is still far from modeling
all of natural language inference.
15 Similarly, the hand-authored explanations for 4th Grade Sci-
acterizing which inferences should be deductive vs. which
can be assumed in NLI, and how to control such flexibility, re-
main significant open questions. Regardless of how these is-
sues are resolved, though, our experiments suggest that trans-
formers may may be able to learn the target reasoning given
appropriate training.16
6 Conclusion
Can transformers emulate reasoning with explicitly stated
rulebases? We have presented substantial evidence that they
can, at least within the constrained environments explored in
this paper. Within these environments, we have shown that
transformers can reliably (95%+) replicate the i/o behavior
of a formal reasoner, including on questions at greater in-
ference depths than in training, independently hand-crafted
problems, and problems expressed in more natural language.
In addition, we have shown that they can, with high reliability
(94.1% F1), identify which context sentences a provably true
fact depends on, suggesting they have learned some model of
fact dependency - i.e., a kind of inference chain - internally.
The exact nature of the underlying neural inference remains
an open question.
Regardless of mechanism, the ability to reason (or emulate
reasoning) over rules expressed in language has potentially
far-reaching implications. For example, rules might be re-
trieved from natural sources (e.g., science texts, Wikipedia),
and if a system’s answer is derivable from a subset of re-
trieved rules, then those rules form a valid explanation for the
answer. Similarly, if the answer is wrong, the explanation can
be traced to find the source of the error, and the bad knowl-
edge potentially corrected. Finally, the mechanism opens the
door to performing neural counterfactual reasoning, by pro-
viding counterfactual facts to reason with. For example, we
can modify the earlier “birds” rulebase to describe a world in
which birds typically don’t fly, but where ostriches can fly,
and see the consequences; or imagine a world in which plas-
tic is a type of metal, and see how the conductivity of objects
change (Appendix C). To encourage further progress, all our
datasets and an interactive demo are available at http://rule-
reasoning.apps.allenai.org/.
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Appendix
A. Logic for the ‘Birds” Rulebase
Sergot’s original logic17 for the “birds” rulebase is as follows
(“not” denotes negation as failure, “¬” denotes hard nega-
tion):
% Rules:
% If someone is a bird and not abnormal then they can fly.
can fly(X)← bird(X), not abnormal bird(X)
% If someone is an ostrich then they are a bird.
bird(X)← ostrich(X)
% If someone is an ostrich then they are abnormal.
abnormal bird(X)← ostrich(X)
% If someone is an ostrich then they cannot fly.
¬can fly(X)← ostrich(X)
% If someone is a bird and wounded
% then they are abnormal.
abnormal bird(X)← bird(X), wounded(X)
% If someone is wounded then they cannot fly.
¬can fly(X)← wounded(X)
% And the following facts:
% Arthur is a bird and not wounded.
bird(arthur). ¬wounded(arthur).
% Bill is an ostrich.
ostrich(bill).
% Colin is a bird and wounded.
bird(colin). wounded(colin).
% Dave is not an ostrich and wounded.
¬ostrich(dave). wounded(dave).
B. The “Electricity” Rulebases
The four electricity rulebases, and the scenario vocabularies,
exactly as provided to the model, are shown below:
B1. Electricity1
Rulebase
If a circuit has a switch and the switch is on then the circuit is
complete.
If a circuit does not have a switch then the circuit is complete.
If a circuit is complete and the circuit has a light bulb then the
light bulb is glowing.
If a circuit is complete and the circuit has a bell then the bell
is ringing.
If a circuit is complete and the circuit has a radio then the
radio is playing.
Scenario Generation
A circuit has a switch. (included as a fact with p=0.5)
A switch is on. (p=0.5)
A circuit has a light bulb. | A circuit has a bell | A circuit
has a radio. (select 1)
17https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/∼mjs/teaching/KnowledgeRep491/
ExtendedLP 491-2x1.pdf, p5
B2. Electricity2
Rulebase
If a circuit has a switch and the switch is on then the circuit is
complete.
If a circuit does not have a switch then the circuit is complete.
If a circuit is complete then a current runs through the circuit.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a light
bulb then the light bulb is glowing.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a bell
then the bell is ringing.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a radio
then the radio is playing.
Scenario Generation
A circuit has a switch. (p=0.5)
A switch is on. (p=0.5)
A circuit has a light bulb. | A circuit has a bell | A circuit
has a radio. (select 1 fact)
B3. Electricity3
Rulebase
If a circuit has a battery then the circuit is powered.
If a circuit does not have a battery then the circuit is dead.
If a circuit is dead then a bell is not ringing.
If a circuit is dead then a radio is not playing.
If a circuit is dead then a light bulb is not glowing.
If a circuit has a switch and the switch is on then the circuit is
complete.
If a circuit does not have a switch then the circuit is complete.
If a circuit is powered and the circuit is complete then a cur-
rent runs through the circuit.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a light
bulb then the light bulb is glowing.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a bell
then the bell is ringing.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit has a radio
then the radio is playing.
Scenario Generation
A circuit has a battery. (p=0.9)
A circuit has a switch. (p=0.5)
A switch is on. (p=0.5)
A circuit has a light bulb. | A circuit has a bell | A circuit
has a radio. (select 1)
B4. Electricity4
Rulebase
If a circuit includes a battery and the battery is not flat then
the circuit is powered.
If a circuit includes a switch and the switch is on then the cir-
cuit is complete.
If a circuit does not include a switch then the circuit is com-
plete.
If a wire is metal then the wire is conducting.
If a wire is plastic then the wire is not conducting.
If a circuit is powered and the circuit is complete and a wire
is conducting then a current runs through the circuit.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit includes a
light bulb then the current runs through the light bulb.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit includes a
bell then the current runs through the bell.
If a current runs through a circuit and the circuit includes a
radio then the current runs through the radio.
If a current runs through a light bulb then the light bulb is
glowing.
If a current runs through a bell then the bell is ringing.
If a current runs through a radio then the radio is playing.
Scenario Generation
A circuit includes a battery. (p=0.9)
A battery is flat. (p=0.2)
A circuit includes a switch. (p=0.5)
A switch is on. (p=0.7)
A wire is metal. | A wire is plastic. (select 1, p(metal)=0.9)
A circuit includes a light bulb. | A circuit includes a bell | A
circuit includes a radio. (select 1)
C. Counterfactuals
Because our models reason with explicitly provided knowl-
edge (rather than latent, fixed, pretrained knowledge), they
can support counterfactual reasoning by providing counter-
factual statements in the context. This is something that trans-
formers have not previously been used for. As an anecdotal
example, we take a context that implies that iron nails are
conductors (where C=context, Q=question, A=answer), and
illustrate with our model’s predictions18:
C: Metal things conduct electricity. Insulated things do not
conduct electricity. Nails are iron.
Q: A nail conducts electricity?
A: TRUE
We can now make this counterfactual by declaring iron as
an insulator. The model then correctly changes its answer to
conclude iron nails would then not conduct electricity:
C: Metals conduct electricity. Insulators do not conduct
electricity. Nails are insulators.
Q: A nail conducts electricity?
A: FALSE
Similarly given a context implying plastic nails do not con-
duct:
C: Metals conduct electricity. Insulators do not conduct
electricity. Plastic is an insulator. Nails are plastic.
Q: A nail conducts electricity?
A: FALSE
we can modify it by adding the counterfactual that plastics
are metals. Again the model correctly changes its answer to
infer that therefore plastic nails will conduct electricity:
C: Metals conduct electricity. Insulators do not conduct
electricity. Plastic is a metal. Nails are plastic.
Q: A nail conducts electricity?
A: TRUE
This capability is a potentially powerful new avenue for using
transformers.
18Live demo available at http://rule-reasoning.apps.allenai.org/
